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Abstract
This paper compares the performance of selected personality aspects and ability on explaining the overeducation status of the
individual. Ability is deﬁned as the difference between the actual and the predicted income. Personality proves to be an important
factor affecting the risk of overeducation. For females, personality allows to better explain mismatch than ability. For males,
ability frequently, but not always, performs better than personality. Controlling for personality allows for better classiﬁcation of the
non-overeducated, while controlling for ability improves the classiﬁcation of the overeducated. The study is done on the pooled
sample of 23 European countries, as well as for Eastern, Western, Northern, and Southern Europe.
c© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Organising Committee
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1. Introduction
In a perfect labour market, overeducation should not be observed, as workers should always be employed on the
jobs matching their level of education or, more generally, skills. Nevertheless, statistics show that overeducation
does exist [1]. It might, however, be that we observe overeducation simply because we cannot accurately measure
the quality of match between an individual and a job. In particular, there might be some unobserved individual- or
job-speciﬁc factors that, together with the observed factors, make the worker a perfect candidate for his or her job.
Not controlling for such unobserved heterogeneity in mismatch-related models, thus, introduces a bias on the results
of these models.
There are several ways of dealing with unobserved heterogeneity in models related to overeducation. If panel data
are available, it can be controlled for using ﬁxed- or random-effects models [2, 3, 4, 5]. This is an attractive option,
because one does not have to think about the source of unobserved heterogeneity: whatever is inside the concept is
automatically controlled for. Nevertheless, these methods only allow to account for static unobserved factors, leaving
dynamic factors out of consideration.
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If only cross-sectional data are available, unobserved heterogeneity has to be approximated. Variables and methods
employed for this purpose depend on what exactly authors want to control for. The ﬁrst, and most obvious, temptation
is to control for ability. It was approximated by an index of subjective physical and mental health problems and an
index of verbal ability [5], by the difference between the expected and observed earnings [6], and by broad factors
of numeliteracy, proactivity, reliability, consulting, teamwork, physical skills, and autonomy extracted from 44 self-
assessment variables [7]. Alternatively, the sample could be split into subsamples with homogeneous ability, and
models then could be run on these subsamples. Assuming that individuals in the same segment of the earnings
distribution have similar ability, quantile regressions could then be used [8, 9].
Other unobserved individual-speciﬁc factors are also a part of unobserved heterogeneity. For instance, the environ-
ment (in its broad meaning) where the individual lived in childhood might be important. It was approximated by the
number of siblings, the place of residence during childhood, economic problems in the family of origin, and growing
up without at least one parent [5]. One has to note, though, that these variables were chosen as instrumental variables
that affect the choice of education but do not affect wages.
Another block of potentially important factors residing in unobserved heterogeneity is individual’s personality. For
instance, it was shown that personality, as represented by the Five Factor Model [10] (also known as the Big Five)
affects job satisfaction, performance, intention to quit, and turnover [11].
Nevertheless, to the best of my knowledge, personality aspects have not been included as explanatory variables in
models regarding overeducation. One of the reasons might be that variables reﬂecting relevant individual behaviour,
beliefs, and values are not available in survey datasets. However, another important reason is that personality, being
a complex concept not readily pluggable into the mathematical framework of economics, is simply overlooked by
economists. Indeed, economic theories, such as human capital theory [12] or signalling theory [13], typically focus
on productivity, for which ability is the key internal (i.e., unobserved) driver.
This paper, thus, compares the performance of selected personality aspects and ability (as approximated by the
difference between expected and actual income) on explaining the overeducation status of the individual.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data and methods used in the analysis. Then
Section 3 presents the results. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2. Data and Methods
I use Round 5 of the European Social Survey (ESS) [14]. This is a biennial survey covering over 30 countries.
Round 5 was ﬁelded in 2010–2011. It covers 27 countries, of which I take 23 (Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Lithuania, the Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK; Estonia and Portugal were removed
because they do not contain some of the key variables employed in the models used here; Russia and Ukraine were
removed because they are quite different from other countries).
In general, I follow the idea of Chevalier [6], who proxies individuals’ abilities with the residuals in the regression
of wages and then feeds these residuals into the regression of overeducation. Because the structure of ESS data is
quite different, alternative methods have to be used.
In [6], the former model used data on individual income. However, ESS does not have such individual-level data.
Instead, its respondents state the total income of their household from all sources. In addition, there is a question
about the share of this total income provided by the respondent. Because there are relatively few observations where
the majority of household income was due to the respondent, I take a broader view and consider two samples: (1)
respondents provide at least half of the total household income, and (2) they provide most or all income of the house-
hold. While it is straightforward that residuals from the wage regression on sample (2) could be used to approximate
individual’s ability, the use of sample (1) deserves more explanation. In using it, I follow the logic of the homophily
principle [15], according to which people form ties (e.g., friendship or marriage) with those similar to them by a subset
of characteristics, including race, ethnicity, religion, as well as education and social class. In particular, I assume that
the level of respondent’s ability could be approximated with abilities of those living with him, i.e., residuals from the
regression on household income.
Another particularity of ESS data on income is that it is given in deciles of national income. For instance, while
there are no data on the absolute income of a given household, the dataset shows that this income belongs to the
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third decile of income distribution in a given country. While this means that regressions of log-wages, as run in
[6], cannot be employed here, this national-decile-based reporting of income has a great beneﬁt of being comparable
over countries. In particular, this allows me to pool the data on all countries in the dataset without worrying on
cross-country differences in income levels.
The methodology I employ in this paper is, thus, as follows. Firstly, I run ordered logit regression of the decile of
household income:
Pr(decilei = d) = Pr(kd−1 < xiβ1+yiγ+ εi ≤ kd) . (1)
Standard errors are estimated by sandwich estimator, assuming zero inter-country correlations but non-zero intra-
country correlations of observations [16]. Vector x consists of variables that will also be used in the subsequent re-
gression of overeducation (age, immigrant dummy, student dummy, disability dummy, informal employment dummy
(deﬁned as working without a contract, see [17]), tenure, and country). Vector y consists of variables appearing only
in the income model (age squared, supervisor dummy, ﬁrm size, and industry (NACE rev.2)).
Based on (1), probabilities of each respondent’s household income falling in each decile are predicted. The decile
with the highest probability is then identiﬁed as the predicted income decile. Denoting the actual income decile by di
and the predicted income decile by ˆdi, ability is measured as:
ai ≡ di− ˆdi . (2)
Thus, if the respondent’s household actual income decile is higher than the predicted income decile, he/she is attributed
positive ability. If it is lower, ability is negative. If the prediction is correct, ability is zero. Absolute values of ability
are not important; these are relative values of this variable that will matter.
Then I put this ability variable in the logit regression of overeducation status:
logit [Pr(oi)] = xiβ2+ ziδ +aiξ +ηi . (3)
Standard errors are estimated using the same sandwich estimator as for model (1). Vector z contains variables de-
scribing respondent’s personality. ESS contains several variables measuring the extent of different personality traits in
respondents. Each variable measures respondent’s opinion of how much a person described in the question resembles
him/her. Based on their signiﬁcance in overeducation models, I selected the variables shown in Table 1. For each of
these variables, vector z includes a dummy reﬂecting whether the respondent is “very much like” the description.
I use ISCO-based measure of overeducation. According to it, the overeducated are (1) tertiary graduates working
in occupations belonging to ISCO major groups 4–9 (clerks to elementary occupations), and (2) secondary-educated
individuals employed in elementary occupations (ISCO major group 9). Tertiary education level includes short-
cycle tertiary programmes and vocational tertiary programmes (ISCED 5B). Secondary education level includes post-
secondary non-tertiary programmes (ISCED 4). Individuals employed in military occupations are excluded from
analysis.
All models are run on currently employed individuals aged below 65 and having tenure below 42 years (to mitigate
coefﬁcient bias due to small fractions of the sample with large values of age and/or tenure). Individuals not completed
primary education were removed from the sample. Separate models are run for males and females.
I compare the explanatory power of four versions of model (3):
1. Base model (without personality and ability variables)
2. Base model with personality variables (BP model)
3. Base model with ability variable (BA model)
4. Full model (base model with personality and ability variables)
The explanatory power of a model is measured by:
• Log-likelihood
• McFadden’s pseudo R2, which takes into account only log-likelihood, i.e., general quality of ﬁt
• Akaike (AIC) and Bayesian (BIC) information criteria, which correct for the number of parameters
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Table 1. Personality variables
Short name Original description
Important to be creative Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes
to do things in his own original way.
Important to be rich It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and
expensive things.
Important to be treated equally He thinks it is important that every person in the world should be
treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities
in life.
Important to show abilities It is important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire
what he does.
Important to try new things He likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. He thinks
it is important to do lots of different things in life.
Important to follow rules He believes that people should do what they’re told. He thinks people
should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching.
Important to make decisions freely It is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does.
He likes to be free and not depend on others.
Important to help people It’s very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to
care for their well-being.
Important to seek adventures He looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He wants to have an
exciting life.
Important to get respect It is important to him to get respect from others. He wants people to
do what he says.
Important to be loyal to friends It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote
himself to people close to him.
• Sensitivity (the share of overeducated respondents correctly classiﬁed by the model), and speciﬁcity (the share of
non-overeducated respondents correctly classiﬁed by the model), which gauge the classiﬁcation capabilities of the
model
The cut-off value for computing sensitivity and speciﬁcity was set to the average overeducation level in the sample
on which the model was run. The predicted probability of overeducation for each respondent was computed after the
model, and the respondent was predicted to be overeducated if this probability was greater than the cut-off value.
3. Results
The results of model (3) are shown in Table 2 for respondents providing at least half of household income and in
Table 3 for those providing most of household income.
Regardless of whether their income is at least half or most of household income, males have twice fewer personality
factors inﬂuencing their chances of overeducation than females have. Moreover, the signiﬁcant factors rarely overlap
across gender. Even when they do overlap, they not necessarily work in the same direction (as in the case of the
importance of equal treatment when respondent’s income is most of household income).
The general quality of ﬁt, measured by the change in log-likelihood and pseudo R2, is better in BP models than
in BA models for females, regardless of their income’s share in household income, and for males bringing most of
household income.
Information criteria, however, mainly favour BA models over BP models. The only exception is for females
bringing at least half of household income, where AIC favours the BP model over the BA model.
This means that while BP models allow for a better ﬁt than BA models, the increase is not enough for the inclusion
of so many variables. However, this should not be a surprise. The ability variable was generated as a residual, which,
by deﬁnition, alone represents all other relevant characteristics not accounted for in the regression of income. On the
other hand, each personality variable measures a distinct trait, which, however complex it might be, covers only a part
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Table 2. Odds ratios after logit, respondent’s income is at least half of household income
Males Females
Base BP BA Full Base BP BA Full
Age 1.012* 1.011* 1.011* 1.010† 1.008 1.009 1.009 1.010
Immigrant 1.453*** 1.435*** 1.508*** 1.489*** 1.943*** 1.972*** 1.992*** 2.023***
Student 1.552 1.586 1.501 1.535 0.626 0.644 0.624 0.630
Disabled 1.124 1.113 1.166 1.153 1.446*** 1.490*** 1.521*** 1.558***
Informal empl. 1.246 1.225 1.302† 1.283 1.423* 1.548** 1.535** 1.663**
Tenure 0.973*** 0.973*** 0.973*** 0.973*** 0.970*** 0.969*** 0.968*** 0.967***
Imp. to be creative 0.833† 0.844† 0.620*** 0.626***
Imp. to be rich
Imp. to be treated equally 0.843† 0.841†
Imp. to show abilities 0.801† 0.816
Imp. to try new things 1.258† 1.280*
Imp. to follow rules 0.664† 0.670†
Imp. to make decisions freely
Imp. to help people 1.263* 1.263*
Imp. to seek adventures 1.552† 1.550*
Imp. to get respect
Imp. to be loyal to friends 0.742*** 0.740***
Ability 0.934** 0.934** 0.909*** 0.912***
Constant 0.081*** 0.086*** 0.081*** 0.085*** 0.044*** 0.052*** 0.042*** 0.049***
Quality of Fit
N 5778 4255
Pseudo R2 0.0275 0.0297 0.0307 0.0328 0.0563 0.0691 0.0641 0.0763
Log-likelihood –1755.88 –1751.84 –1750.11 –1746.22 –1334.96 –1316.87 –1323.93 –1306.73
AIC 3523.76 3521.67 3514.21 3512.44 2683.91 2659.74 2663.85 2641.46
BIC 3563.73 3581.63 3560.85 3579.06 2728.40 2742.37 2714.70 2730.45
Sensitivity 61.4 % 60.3 % 63.0 % 63.0 % 65.7 % 66.1 % 67.7 % 67.3 %
Speciﬁcity 55.9 % 56.4 % 56.8 % 57.2 % 57.6 % 60.2 % 59.1 % 60.5 %
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10; † p < 0.15
Odds ratios for country dummies not reported.
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Table 3. Odds ratios after logit, respondent’s income is a very large fraction of household income
Males Females
Base BP BA Full Base BP BA Full
Age 1.016* 1.017** 1.015* 1.016** 1.011 1.013 1.008 1.010
Immigrant 1.383 1.389 1.409 1.415 1.890*** 1.843*** 1.926*** 1.880***
Student 1.495 1.563 1.406 1.467 0.696 0.701 0.639 0.597
Disabled 0.926 0.943 0.961 0.977 1.433† 1.502* 1.469* 1.553*
Informal empl. 1.387 1.417 1.431 1.466 1.839*** 2.069*** 1.933** 2.178***
Tenure 0.969*** 0.967*** 0.967*** 0.966*** 0.973*** 0.969*** 0.974*** 0.971***
Imp. to be creative 0.445*** 0.477***
Imp. to be rich 2.140** 2.312**
Imp. to be treated equally 0.779* 0.781* 1.376† 1.363†
Imp. to show abilities
Imp. to try new things 1.394* 1.396*
Imp. to follow rules 0.610† 0.607†
Imp. to make decisions freely 0.749* 0.756†
Imp. to help people 0.672** 0.653**
Imp. to seek adventures
Imp. to get respect 1.978*** 1.952***
Imp. to be loyal to friends 0.676** 0.681**
Ability 0.936* 0.937* 0.808*** 0.811***
Constant 0.076*** 0.081*** 0.076*** 0.080*** 0.032*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.044***
Quality of Fit
N 2687 1943
Pseudo R2 0.0282 0.0328 0.0317 0.0361 0.0763 0.1066 0.1006 0.1296
Log-likelihood –809.26 –805.44 –806.37 –802.68 –575.29 –556.38 –560.14 –542.07
AIC 1632.53 1630.88 1628.73 1627.36 1164.59 1140.76 1136.29 1114.13
BIC 1673.80 1689.84 1675.90 1692.22 1203.59 1218.77 1180.86 1197.71
Sensitivity 61.8 % 62.5 % 61.1 % 60.7 % 72.4 % 68.7 % 72.8 % 72.8 %
Speciﬁcity 57.0 % 57.8 % 58.3 % 57.8 % 55.5 % 62.8 % 60.4 % 62.8 %
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10; † p < 0.15
Odds ratios for country dummies not reported.
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Table 4. Quality of ﬁt of logit regressions in country groups, respondent’s income is at least half of household income
Males Females
Base BP BA Full Base BP BA Full
Eastern Europe
N 1501 1200
Pseudo R2 0.0548 0.0747 0.0551 0.0756 0.0453 0.0817 0.0644 0.0994
Log-likelihood –378.31 –370.36 –378.19 –369.99 –397.33 –382.17 –389.36 –374.79
AIC 768.63 754.71 770.39 753.97 806.66 778.34 792.72 763.58
BIC 800.51 791.91 807.59 791.17 837.20 813.97 828.35 799.21
Sensitivity 60.2 % 58.4 % 61.9 % 61.1 % 54.0 % 62.6 % 64.0 % 61.9 %
Speciﬁcity 60.5 % 64.0 % 59.8 % 63.8 % 61.6 % 61.3 % 61.2 % 62.6 %
Western Europe
N 2163 1565
Pseudo R2 0.0268 0.0303 0.0429 0.0461 0.0675 0.0912 0.0859 0.1067
Log-likelihood –754.30 –751.65 –741.85 –739.40 –433.24 –422.25 –424.69 –415.06
AIC 1520.60 1515.31 1495.71 1490.81 878.49 856.49 861.39 842.12
BIC 1554.67 1549.38 1529.78 1524.89 910.62 888.63 893.52 874.25
Sensitivity 62.6 % 59.3 % 64.0 % 64.0 % 75.2 % 68.5 % 72.5 % 72.5 %
Speciﬁcity 57.0 % 58.5 % 60.7 % 61.4 % 53.7 % 60.7 % 58.3 % 61.9 %
Northern Europe
N 1313 878
Pseudo R2 0.0388 0.0480 0.0764 0.0838 0.0410 0.0497 0.0712 0.0787
Log-likelihood –310.50 –307.52 –298.34 –295.97 –236.70 –234.54 –229.23 –227.40
AIC 629.01 623.04 604.69 599.94 479.40 475.09 464.46 460.80
BIC 649.73 643.76 625.41 620.66 493.74 489.42 478.79 475.13
Sensitivity 56.6 % 59.0 % 68.0 % 67.2 % 57.4 % 59.6 % 64.9 % 66.0 %
Speciﬁcity 63.4 % 64.1 % 66.0 % 66.2 % 60.6 % 61.5 % 64.9 % 64.9 %
Southern Europe
N 801 612
Pseudo R2 0.0049 0.0062 0.0098 0.0112 0.0544 0.0742 0.0570 0.0765
Log-likelihood –296.97 –296.59 –295.52 –295.10 –259.03 –253.60 –258.30 –252.96
AIC 599.95 599.19 597.04 596.20 526.05 515.21 524.60 513.93
BIC 614.00 613.24 611.10 610.25 543.72 532.87 542.27 531.94
Sensitivity 40.7 % 49.6 % 46.9 % 51.3 % 58.4 % 62.8 % 58.4 % 66.4 %
Speciﬁcity 68.8 % 58.1 % 56.5 % 58.4 % 63.9 % 59.9 % 60.9 % 60.7 %
Signiﬁcant personality variables for males in Eastern Europe are: important to show abilities (–), help people (+), seek adventures (–), and get respect (–); in Western Europe: to be rich (+) and
treated equally (–); in Northern Europe: to be creative (–), try new things (+), follow rules (+), and help people (+); in Southern Europe: to be treated equally (–). For females in Eastern Europe:
to be creative (–), be treated equally (+), follow rules (–), seek adventures (+), and be loyal to friends (–); in Western Europe: to show abilities (–), try new things (+), make decisions freely (–),
seek adventures (+), and be loyal to friends (–); in Northern Europe: to be creative (–); in Southern Europe: to be creative (–), be treated equally (+), follow rules (–), and be loyal to friends (–).
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Table 5. Quality of ﬁt of logit regressions in country groups, respondent’s income is a very large fraction of household income
Males Females
Base BP BA Full Base BP BA Full
Eastern Europe
N 584 481
Pseudo R2 0.1158 0.1406 0.1355 0.1550 0.0575 0.1121 0.0852 0.1438
Log-likelihood –131.25 –127.57 –128.32 –125.42 –145.15 –136.75 –140.89 –131.87
AIC 274.49 267.14 270.65 264.84 306.31 289.50 297.78 279.74
BIC 300.71 299.72 301.23 295.43 339.71 322.91 331.19 313.15
Sensitivity 52.2 % 54.3 % 65.2 % 63.0 % 56.1 % 63.2 % 64.9 % 66.7 %
Speciﬁcity 74.5 % 72.7 % 71.4 % 70.4 % 63.9 % 64.2 % 64.2 % 65.3 %
Western Europe
N 1114 786
Pseudo R2 0.0283 0.0428 0.0536 0.0677 0.0982 0.1311 0.1114 0.1412
Log-likelihood –380.05 –374.37 –370.16 –364.63 –204.89 –197.41 –201.89 –195.12
AIC 774.09 762.73 754.32 743.26 421.78 406.83 415.77 402.24
BIC 809.20 797.84 789.43 778.37 449.78 434.83 443.78 430.25
Sensitivity 62.5 % 63.4 % 68.8 % 67.0 % 81.8 % 72.7 % 78.4 % 75.0 %
Speciﬁcity 56.0 % 59.2 % 58.5 % 61.7 % 50.0 % 59.0 % 53.4 % 61.3 %
Northern Europe
N 521 370
Pseudo R2 0.0672 0.1163 0.0768 0.1421 0.1059 0.1706
Log-likelihood –132.96 –125.96 –98.87 –91.88 –95.75 –88.82
AIC 273.92 259.93 205.73 191.75 199.50 185.64
BIC 290.94 276.95 221.39 207.41 215.15 201.29
Sensitivity 60.0 % 67.3 % 58.5 % 61.0 % 68.3 % 70.7 %
Speciﬁcity 63.5 % 69.1 % 58.7 % 69.3 % 66.0 % 69.6 %
Southern Europe
N 468 306
Pseudo R2 0.0104 0.0177 0.0104 0.0178 0.0762 0.1682 0.0967 0.1955
Log-likelihood –147.35 –146.27 –147.35 –146.26 –119.68 –107.76 –117.03 –104.22
AIC 300.69 298.54 300.69 298.51 247.35 223.52 242.06 216.44
BIC 313.14 310.99 313.14 310.96 262.25 238.42 256.96 231.33
Sensitivity 56.5 % 48.4 % 56.5 % 48.4 % 66.7 % 70.2 % 70.2 % 77.2 %
Speciﬁcity 50.2 % 50.7 % 50.2 % 51.5 % 65.9 % 66.7 % 63.1 % 72.7 %
Signiﬁcant personality variables for males in Eastern Europe are: important to show abilities (–); in Western Europe: to be treated equally (–), to show abilities (+), and help people (–); in
Southern Europe: to be creative (+), be treated equally (–), show abilities (–), try new things (+), and be loyal to friends (–). For females in Eastern Europe: to show abilities (–), follow rules
(–), and seek adventures (+); in Western Europe: to be creative (–), show abilities (–), try new things (+), make decisions freely (–), and help people (–); in Northern Europe: to be creative (–),
be rich (+), be treated equally (+), try new things (+), make decisions freely (+), help people (–), and seek adventures (–); in Southern Europe: to be creative (–), be rich (+), show abilities (+),
follow rules (–), get respect (+), and be loyal to friends (–). No personality variables are signiﬁcant for males in Northern Europe. Ordered logit estimated by BFGS algorithm for females in
Southern Europe, as Stata’s modiﬁed Newton-Raphson algorithm did not converge.
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of the whole universe of personality traits inﬂuencing the possibility of mismatch. Thus, the increase in the overall
quality of ﬁt is more relevant than the decrease in the quality of ﬁt reported by information criteria. Nevertheless, in
cases where information criteria favour the BP model, personality factors are so powerful that they are able to beat the
ability factor, even taking into account that there are multiple variables representing the former.
A unanimously better classiﬁcation accuracy can be determined only for males bringing at least half of household
income. In that case, the BA model leads to both higher sensitivity and speciﬁcity than the BP model. In the other
three cases, the model performing better on predicting one of the two outcomes performs worse on predicting the
other. For males bringing most household income, superior sensitivity is given by the BP model, but the BA model
allows for better speciﬁcity. For females, regardless of their income’s share in household income, the BP model
performs better on classifying the non-overeducated, but the BA model on classifying the overeducated.
To ﬁnd out whether the results will differ when analysing smaller country groups, I divide the countries geograph-
ically into Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia),
Western Europe (Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK), Northern Europe
(Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden), and Southern Europe (Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and Spain). Tables 4 and 5
show the quality-of-ﬁt statistics.
On the country-group level, the best model by the overall quality of ﬁt is also the best by the information criteria.
In all four country groups, data for females are better ﬁt by BP models everywhere, except for Northern European
females bringing at least half of household income. On the contrary, data for males are better ﬁt with BA models,
except for Eastern Europe (regardless of the share in household income) and Southern Europe (when bringing most
of household income).
With a single exception of Southern European respondents bringing at least half of household income, BA models
are better able to correctly classify the overeducated. Regarding speciﬁcity, BP models perform better for respon-
dents bringing most of household income (except for Northern European males, where no personality factor was
found signiﬁcant). Among those contributing to at least half of household income, BP models perform better for
Eastern Europeans, Western European females, and Southern European males, while BA models have higher correct
classiﬁcation ratios for Northern Europeans, Western European males, and Southern European females.
To understand whether it pays off to include both personality and ability factors in models, I will now compare
the performance of Full models to that of BP and BA models. Both on the pan-European and country-group levels,
Full models lead to higher overall quality of ﬁt than either BP or BA models. In country groups, Full models were
also selected as the best by information criteria, while on the pooled sample, AIC favours Full models and BIC—BA
models.
Unfortunately, in only half of the cases there are improvements in both sensitivity and speciﬁcity in Full models
over BP and BA models. In most of the other cases, one of these classiﬁcation indicators (mostly, speciﬁcity) is
improved in Full models. There are, however, cases when one of these indicators is worse in Full models than either
in BP or BA models.
4. Conclusions
This paper showed that personality is an important factor affecting the chances of overeducation. Including person-
ality factors allows to better explain the mismatch risk for females, while for males, ability frequently performs better
as an explanatory variable. Personality-only models are mostly better in correctly classifying the non-overeducated,
while ability-only models—in correctly classifying the overeducated. Researchers should check whether including
personality factors pays off in their particular models and samples, but the results of this paper show that personal-
ity might be an important predictor of individual’s state in the labour market and, thus, should be considered when
building the model.
Further research on this topic should continue in three non-exclusive directions. Firstly, the effects of personality
traits on other measures of overeducation (for instance, those based on mean or median years of education in a
given occupation group) should be assessed. Secondly, the performance of personality vs. ability should be assessed
on narrower samples (for separate countries, for separate age groups, etc.), which should allow for better sample
homogeneity. Thirdly, alternative measures for personality traits (e.g., from the Five Factor Model) and/or for ability
could be used.
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